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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The rise of employment arbitration in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1991 Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.1 decision has been accompanied by vigorous debates over the 
relative advantages or dangers of using arbitration to resolve statutory claims by employees. 
Advocates have advanced arguments for the relative speed, efficiency and fairness of 
employment arbitration.2 Critics of employment arbitration have raised concerns about due 
process protections, cost barriers, unfavorable outcomes for employees, and dangers of repeat 
player biases in favor of employers.3 Unfortunately, over the past decade and a half, the 
volume of arguments raised for and against employment arbitration have far outnumbered the 
pieces of empirical research bearing on these questions. However, over time there has been a 
gradual increase in the number of empirical studies of employment arbitration. These studies 
have featured a growing use of more sophisticated, rigorous methodologies that allow us to 
begin to answer some of the critical questions surrounding employment arbitration. 
 The present paper examines the empirical research on employment arbitration, focusing 
on a series of critical issues. First, what is the extent of adoption of employment arbitration and 
                                                     
 1. 500 U.S. 20, 24-27,35 (1991). 
 2. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1349-52, 1356-59 (1997) [hereinafter Estriecher, Predispute Agreements] (arguing that 
employment arbitration is "less expensive, more expeditious, less draining and divisive" than litigation); Samuel 
Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DlSF. RESOL. 559, 560-61, 563-68 (2001) [hereinafter Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws] 
(discussing that studies "suggest[] that properly designed employment arbitration systems can out-perform court-
based htigation systems . . . because arbitration proceedings tend to be informal (and quicker)").  
 3. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer 
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 33, 36-40, 69-82, 101-04, 106-30 (arguing that 
clauses requiring pre-dispute arbitration prevent employees from exercising statutory rights and favor employers); 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of 
the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019-20, 0136-49 (1996) (arguing that mandatory employment arbitration 
clauses in hiring contracts raise due process concerns in part because employees "lack bargaining power and are 
needful of employment" when they sign hiring contracts). 
what factors influence the decision by employers to adopt these procedures? Second, what are 
the outcomes of employment arbitration cases? In particular, how often do employees win in 
arbitration and what are the damages awarded in arbitration? To evaluate the answers to these 
questions, it is also important to look at the outcomes of employment litigation and compare 
arbitration to these. Third, is there a repeat player effect favoring employers in employment 
arbitration? This question has been of particular prominence in debates over employment 
arbitration and as a result deserves separate consideration. Fourth, what is the relationship 
 between employment arbitration and other aspects of organizational dispute resolution 
systems such as internal grievance procedures? And, lastly, how does employment arbitration 
affect other human resource outcomes? 
 In addition to reviewing the existing empirical research on employment arbitration, I 
also investigate some of the major issues in this area using more recent data from arbitrations 
conducted under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). State law in 
California requires arbitration service providers to provide public filings of certain key 
information about arbitrations they administer involving consumers.4 The filings by the AAA 
under this California law include all arbitration cases filed nationally involving consumers, not 
just those from California. Among employment arbitration cases, these filings include only 
those arbitration cases based on employer promulgated agreements, i.e. consumer-type 
arbitrations, and not cases based on individually negotiated agreements. As a result, the data in 
these filings relate specifically to the type of arbitration cases implicated in the Gilmer5 and 
                                                     
 4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2007).  
 5. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-27, 35 (1991). 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams6 cases that have been the primary focus of the debates over 
mandatory arbitration. Although there are some limitations to the information that service 
providers are required to include, these filings nonetheless provide an extremely valuable new 
source of data for researchers. In particular the requirement that service providers include data 
on all arbitration cases filed with them results in larger datasets on arbitration outcomes than 
have been available in earlier studies. Another important feature of this data is that the filings 
include more recent decisions, from 2003 to the present, than the arbitration decisions 
examined in previous studies. As a result, they are likely to provide a better indicator of the 
nature of the more fully developed system of employment arbitration, over fifteen years after 
Gilmer, a decade after the Due Process Protocol,7 and a half decade after Circuit City. In this 
paper, I report results from an analysis of a sample of 2763 employment arbitration cases 
administered by the AAA from January 1, 2003 to September 30, 2006, which produced 836 
employment arbitration awards (I will refer to these as the "AAA C-filings data"), 
II. THE EXTENT OF ADOPTION OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
 One of the most basic empirical questions concerning employment arbitration is how 
widespread these procedures have become. Unfortunately, the existing research on this 
question is very limited in extent. Unlike issues like the extent of union representation, which is 
annually measured and reported on by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there is no standard 
                                                     
 6. 532 U.S. 105, at 108-15, 119-24 (2001) (holding that courts can enforce agreements to arbitrate in 
employment contracts).  
 7. In 1995 a Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment comprised of arbitration 
professionals created a model standard for employment arbitrations that focused on preserving due process 
protections. See DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION & ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING 
OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), available at 
<http://www.naarb.org/due_process/due.process.html> [hereinafter DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL]. 
public data set indicating the percentage of organizations that have adopted employment 
arbitration procedures. To get a picture of the extent to which employment arbitration has 
spread through American workplaces, we need to draw on evidence from a series of different 
studies that in the course of examining various related issues gathered statistics on the 
adoption of employment arbitration. 
 The contemporary phenomenon of employment arbitration received its initial major 
impetus with the Supreme Court's 1991 Gilmer decision. An early indication of the extent of 
adoption of employment arbitration soon after the Gilmer decision is provided by a 1992 
survey conducted by Peter Feuille and Denise Chachere.8 In their study, Feuille and Chachere 
surveyed 195 alumni of a Masters in Industrial Relations and Human Resources (IRHR) program 
on the types of dispute resolution procedures available for nonunion employees in the 
organization where they were employed. Among various questions about the characteristics of 
these procedures, the survey asked if the procedures included arbitration.9 Of the respondents, 
2.1 percent indicated that their organizations had adopted employment arbitration.10 This 
estimate is likely to somewhat overstate the overall extent of adoption of employment 
arbitration at this point in time, since the types of employers likely to hire alumni of a graduate 
program in IRHR are also likely to have relatively sophisticated human resource management 
practices, including more elaborate dispute resolution procedures.11 However, the results of 
                                                     
 8. Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair and Being Fair: Remedial Voice Procedures in Nonunion 
Workplaces, 21 J. MGMT. 27 (1995). 
 9. Id. at, 31-32. 
 10. Id. at 36. 
 11. Id. at 30-32 (stating that the since the survey "deliberately oversampled large firms with more formal 
HR policies " that its results may not be representative of "all of this country's private employers."). 
this study do give us a good indication of the relatively limited extent of adoption of 
employment arbitration at the time around the Gilmer decision. 
 The next major study providing an indication of the spread of employment arbitration is 
a 1995 General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of use of alternative dispute resolution 
procedures.12 The GAO surveyed 1448 establishments subject to Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) reporting requirements.13 Of the respondents, 9.9 percent 
indicated that they had adopted employment arbitration procedures for nonunion 
employees.14 However, when the GAO contacted these employers seeking additional details of 
their procedures, a number of respondents indicated that they did not in fact have employment 
arbitration procedures.15 One major reason for the erroneous responses was respondents 
indicating they had employment arbitration procedures when what they actually had were 
labor arbitration procedures for unionized employees.16 This type of confusion by respondents 
is something all researchers need to be concerned about in this area. Fortunately, the GAO's 
additional step of contacting employers for follow-up questions allows us to correct for this 
problem in the responses. With this correction made, the GAO survey results indicate a 7.6 
percent incidence of employment arbitration.17 As with the Feuille and Chachere study, to the 
extent that employers subject to OFCCP reporting requirements are likely to have heightened 
                                                     
 12. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS 95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, MOST 
PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-8 (1995), available at 
<http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/he95150.pdf>. 
 13. Id. at 1-3, 24. 
 14. Id. at. at7. 
 15. Id. at 22. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
awareness of employment law issues, these results may somewhat overestimate the incidence 
of employment arbitration compared to the general population of employers. Nevertheless, the 
results do strongly suggest the expansion of employment arbitration in the early 1990s. 
 Two more recent studies from my own research provide further indications of the 
continued expansion of employment arbitration. These studies were part of a broader research 
project on changing patterns of work and employment practices in the telecommunications 
industry.18 In a 1998 survey of 213 establishments in the telecommunications industry, I found 
that 16.3 percent had adopted employment arbitration procedures.19 This survey included 
multiple questions designed to separate out procedures for unionized employees and avoid 
respondents confusing labor arbitration with employment arbitration.20 However, the survey 
was also specifically directed at issues concerning alternative dispute resolution, which may 
have led to some response bias of organizations with more elaborate dispute resolution 
procedures, including employment arbitration, being more likely to respond.21 In a subsequent 
2003 survey of establishments in the telecommunications industry, this problem of potential 
response bias was reduced by embedding the questions concerning employment arbitration in 
a general survey of work and employment practices.22 In this 2003 survey, out of 291 
                                                     
 18. Rosemary Batt et al., Telecoms 2004: Strategy, H.R. Practices & Performance, Final Report of the 
Cornell-Rutgers Telecommunications Project (2004) (unpublished survey) (on file with the author). 
 19. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies, and the Rise of Nonunion 
Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 375, 381-83, 385 (2003) [hereinafter Covin, Institutional 
Pressures]. 
 20. Id. at 381-85. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the 
Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 581, 586-92 (2004) [hereinafter 
Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shop Floor]. 
respondents, 14.1 percent had adopted employment arbitration procedures.23 This figure 
represents the percentage of employers that had adopted employment arbitration 
procedures.24 Since employers with larger workforces were more likely to have adopted these 
procedures, the percentage of employees covered by employment arbitration procedures was 
higher.25 Adjusting for workforce size of the establishments, 22.7 percent of nonunion 
employees in this survey were covered by employment arbitration procedures. Although this 
was an industry specific survey26 and there may be some variation across industries, this study 
does provide a relatively recent general indication of the extent of expansion of employment 
arbitration. 
 An estimate of similar magnitude was found in a national survey of firms conducted in 
2000 by Galle and Koen.27 Out of a sample of 123 firms, they found that 19 percent had 
adopted employment arbitration procedures.28 Although the response rate for this survey (12.3 
percent)29 was somewhat lower than for the other studies discussed above, its estimate of the 
incidence of employment arbitration is generally consistent with their findings. 
 Although there are limitations to the existing studies, they do show a consistent pattern 
of significant expansion of employment arbitration in the decade and a half since the Gilmer 
decision. Extrapolating from them, a current estimate in the range of 15 to 25 percent of 
                                                     
 23. Id. at 587 (citing Batt et al., supra note 18). 
 24. See Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shop Floor, supra note 22, at 586-89. 
 25. See id. at 586-92. 
 26. Id. at 586, 588 (stating that the survey was specific to the telecommuncations industry). 
 27. William P. Galle Jr. & Clifford M. Koen, Reducing Post-Termination Disputes: A National Survey of 
Contract Clauses Used in Employment Contracts, 9 J. INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. 277,234-41 (2001). 
 28. Id. at 234,239. 
 29. Id. at 234. 
employers having adopted employment arbitration seems reasonable.30 Although still a 
minority of employers, it is worth noting that this would make employment arbitration the 
process for resolving employment law claims for a substantial number of employees. For 
example, by comparison, the unionization rate was only 12.0 percent in 2006,31 suggesting that 
employment arbitration is likely already a more widespread system for governing employment 
relations than collective bargaining and labor arbitration. 
 Adoption of employment arbitration procedures is currently a decision at the discretion 
of individual employers. What do we know about the factors leading employers to adopt 
employment arbitration? Given that employment arbitration provides employers with a way to 
avoid litigation through the courts for employment law claims, one factor likely to affect the 
adoption of employment arbitration is the extent to which the employer perceives itself as 
subject to the threat of litigation. In my own field research examining procedures in individual 
firms, I found that adoption of employment arbitration was strongly influenced by past 
experiences with litigation.32 Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher also found in their field research that 
litigation was a key driver of innovation in dispute resolution procedures.33 In addition, 
employers were also influenced by the extent to which they were operating in environments 
where there were higher levels of employment litigation activity, for example in California in 
                                                     
 30. See Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shop Floor, supra note 22, at 587-91. 
 31. U.S. Dep't of Lab., Bureau of Labor Statistics, MLR: The Editor's Desk: Union Membership in 2006 
(2007), available at < http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk4/art05.htm>. 
 32. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Citizens and Citadels: Dispute Resolution and the Governance of Employment 
Relations (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Colvin, 
Citizens and Citadels]. 
 33. DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT 58-61,75-76 
(2003). 
the early 1990s.34 These case study based findings are supported by survey data analysis 
indicating that adoption of employment arbitration is more likely in states where employment 
law pressures on employers are greater.35 
II. EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION OUTCOMES 
A. Employee Win Rates 
 One of the most basic empirical questions regarding employment arbitration is how 
often employees win their cases in arbitration. Although this is a simple question, providing a 
definitive answer to it has proven difficult. Indeed part of the challenge in investigating this 
issue is that employee win rates may vary with factors such as the time period and type of 
dispute involved. 
 A number of the early studies examining employee win rates in arbitration involved 
analysis of American Arbitration Association (AAA) employment arbitration cases, primarily 
from the early 1990s. The results for these studies are relatively consistent. In a sample of AAA 
Commerical Arbitration awards from 1992 involving employment disputes. Lisa Bingham found 
an employee win rate of 74 percent.36 Bingham also found a win rate of 70 percent in a 
subsequent study of AAA arbitration awards from 1993 and 1994.37 Similarly, in a sample of 
AAA employment arbitration decisions from 1993-95, Lewis Maltby found an employee win 
                                                     
 34. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Adoption and Use of Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Nonunion Workplace, 
in 13 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS 69, 70-71, 80-87 (David Lewin & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 
2004) [hereinafter, Colvin, Adoption and Use]. 
 35. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, supra note 19, at 375, 377-80, 385-88, 389-91. 
 36. Lisa B. Bingham, An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United States: Law, Public Policy and 
Data, N.Z. J. INDUS. REL., June 1998, at 5, 11 [hereinafter, Bingham, Overview]. 
37. Id. at 12 (finding 70 percent win rate for employees with "one-time player employers"). 
rate of 66 percent.38 Lastly in a 1995 study of AAA employment arbitration cases, William 
Howard found an employee win rate of 68 percent.39 
 Although these studies all produce consistent results, a couple of important caveats to 
them should be recognized. First, these studies were conducted of AAA employment arbitration 
awards prior to the adoption of the Due Process Protocol. The high employee win rate even 
prior to the adoption of the Protocol could be taken as suggesting that, at least where 
administered by the AAA, employment arbitration was already a relatively employee friendly 
process. Second, however, it is not clear that the types of cases represented in these AAA 
awards of the early 1990s are representative of the employment arbitration system that has 
arisen in more recent years. In particular, a majority of these awards appear to have involved 
claims by employees, typically managers and executives, under individually negotiated 
contracts, rather than claims brought under arbitration provisions from employment manuals 
or handbooks.40 The results suggest that outcomes vary significantly between these different 
categories of cases. In a sample of 203 AAA awards decided under the AAA's Employment Rules 
between 1993 and 1995, Bingham found that whereas employee claimants won 68.8 percent in 
cases based on individual contracts, employee claimants only won 21.3 percent of the cases 
based on personnel manuals.41This raises the concern that overall employee win rates may be 
                                                     
 38. Lewis L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in Arbitration, in 
How ADR WORKS 915, 921 (Norman Brand ed., 2002). 
 39. Wilham M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, DlSP. RESOL J., Oct-Dec 1995, at 
40, 45. 
 40. See, e.g. Bingham, Overview, supra note 36, at 13, 16 (stating that in a sample of 170 AAA awards 
from 1993 to 1995, 109 of the awards, or 64 percent, were based on individual contracts, compared to 61 awards, 
or 36 percent, based on personnel manuals). 
 41. Id. 
much lower under the employer promulgated mandatory arbitration procedures that have 
expanded in recent years than suggested by some of the early studies in this area. 
 Some of the most vigorous debates surrounding employment arbitration in the 1990s 
involved employment cases being heard under the securities industry arbitration procedures, 
which had been the site of the Gilmer case itself.42 A series of studies have looked at employee 
win rates in cases decided under securities industry arbitration procedures. Among these 
studies, employee win rates ranged from 24 to 55 percent, with win rates generally somewhat 
higher under the NYSE procedures than under the NASD procedures.43 As with the early 1990s 
AAA awards, however, it is important to recognize that the experience under the securities 
industry system may not be representative of more general employment arbitration outcomes. 
Although employment arbitration in the securities industry system has involved numbers of 
cases dealing with statutory claims such as employment discrimination and sexual harassment, 
they also often involve violations of individual contracts and claims by relatively highly paid 
individuals. 
 What is the more recent experience as the system of employment arbitration has 
expanded to encompass a broader range of employees and more particularly since the advent 
of the Due Process Protocol? A 2000 study by Lisa Bingham and Shimon Sarraf extended 
Bingham's earlier work by examining the outcomes of AAA cases decided in 1996 and 1997 
                                                     
 42. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 22-24 (1991).  
 43. See HOYT N. WHEELER ET AL., WORKPLACE JUSTICE WITHOUT UNIONS 48, 50 (W.E. Upjohn Institute 
For Employment Research 2004) (finding 41 percent employee win rate under NYSE procedures and 24 percent 
win rate under NASD procedures). 
during the first year after the implementation of the Protocol.44 In these 58 awards the 
employee win rate was 39.7 percent. In a similar 2003 study, Elizabeth Hill analyzed the 
outcomes of 200 AAA awards from 1999 to 2000.45 Among these awards. Hill found a 43 
percent win rate, consistent with Bingham and Sarraf's results. Both of these studies found that 
outcomes vary with the type of case. In particular, Bingham found an employee win rate of 27.6 
percent in personnel handbook based cases versus 61.3 percent in individual contract based 
cases and, interestingly, an employee win rate of 54.3 percent before, but only 39.7 percent 
after the implementation of the Due Process Protocol.46 Hill found that in contrast to the 
overall 43 percent employee win rate in her sample, the employee win rate was 34 percent in 
cases based on employer promulgated agreements and among those cases only 24 percent 
where the employer had some type of internal grievance procedure that operated prior to 
arbitration.47 
 How do employee win rates in employment arbitration compare to the outcomes of 
litigation? In contrast to the research on employment arbitration, larger scale datasets of 
employment litigation outcomes have been gathered by government agencies. Theodore 
Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill report the results of analysis of such datasets for both federal and 
state court employment litigation outcomes and compare these to AAA employment 
                                                     
 44. Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitrations Before and after the Due Process Protocol 
for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self -
Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: 
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53rd ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 320-28 (Samuel Estreicher & 
David Sherwyn eds., 2004). 
 45. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., May.-Jul. 2003, 
at 8, 11. 
 46. Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 44, at 320-28 (finding 39.7 percent win rate for employees). 
 47. Hill, supra note 45, at 13, 15. 
arbitration awards.48 Using data on 1430 employment discrimination cases in the Federal 
Courts from 1999 to 2000, they find an employee win rate of 36.4 percent.49 Meanwhile, from 
data on 160 state court employment discrimination cases decided in 1996, they report an 
employee win rate of 43.8 percent.50 By contrast, among forty-two AAA awards involving claims 
of employment discrimination, they find an employee win rate of 26.2 percent.51 In addition to 
claims of employment discrimination, Eisenberg and Hill also examine noncivil rights 
employment cases. For non-civil rights cases tried in state courts in 1996, they find an 
employee win rate of 56.6 percent based on a sample of 145 cases.52 By contrast, among non-
civil rights based AAA employment arbitration awards, they find an employee win rate of 50.9 
percent.53 These win rates found by Eisenberg and Hill are consistent with win rates found by 
David Oppenheimer in a study of jury verdicts in California in 1998 and 1999.54 Oppenheimer 
found an employee win rate of 50 percent out of 272 cases based on employment 
discrimination statutes and 59 percent in 117 cases involving common law discharge claims.55
 Eisenberg and Hill also break the results down by type of case.56 The AAA classifies 
employment arbitration cases as "N" type cases, which involve individually negotiated 
                                                     
 48. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical 
Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan.2004, at 44, 46-49, 51-53. 
 49. Id. at 48. 
 50. Id. 
 51. This win rate is calculated by collapsing Eisenberg and Hill's numbers on discrimination claims from 
awards based on individually negotiated and employer promulgated agreements. This is done since there are only 
five awards involving individually negotiated contracts and discrimination based claims in their sample. See id. at 
47-51. 
 52. Id. at 48. 
 53. Id. at 48-49. 
 54. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment 
Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 511, 535-49 (2003). 
 55. Id. at 516, 536. 
 56. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 48, at 46-53. 
agreements, and "P" type cases, which involve employer promulgated agreements. This is an 
important and useful distinction made in the AAA awards since the latter category of P type 
cases involve the mandatory arbitration procedures that have inspired controversy in the wake 
of Gilmer, whereas the N type cases based on individually negotiated agreements are much less 
controversial due to the ability of the employees to bargain over their existence and terms. 
Interestingly, when the results in Eisenberg and Hill's study are broken down into these 
different types of cases, they report an employee win rate of 64.9 percent for the N type cases 
involving individually negotiated agreements and 39.6 percent for the P type cases involving 
employer promulgated agreements.57 Eisenberg and Hill also note that cases based on 
employer promulgated agreements are more likely to involve employees whose salary levels 
are below $60,000, and therefore use the P category of cases as a proxy for lower income 
employee cases.58 Eisenberg and Hill advance the argument that the cases based on individually 
negotiated agreements involving higher paid employees are the more relevant comparison 
group for litigation, since in practice the lower paid employees wouldn't be able to bring cases 
through the court system.59 In their results, however, they describe the results for the P and N 
categories of cases as corresponding to cases involving lower versus higher income employees, 
respectively, instead of the actual categories of employer promulgated versus individually 
negotiated agreements.60 Although there is likely to be a correlation between lower versus 
higher income level and the P versus N case distinction, these categories are not the same and 
                                                     
 57. See id. at 47 
 58. Id. at 46. 
 59. Id. at 48.  
 60. Id. at 47. 
so the better interpretation of their results is as indicating differences between cases involving 
employer promulgated and individual negotiated agreements. 
 In another recent study comparing arbitration and litigation outcome, Michael Delikat 
and Morris Kleiner compared the outcomes of 186 awards made under the auspices of the 
NYSE and NASD between 1997 and 2001, with 125 trials conducted in the Southern District of 
New York over the same time period that involved claims of employment discrimination.61 They 
find an employee win rate of 46 percent in arbitration, but only 33.6 percent in litigation.62 As 
the authors admit, however, it is likely that there are differences in the types of cases brought 
in these forums, with many securities arbitration cases involving contractual claims and 
relatively highly paid employees. Given this likelihood of substantial differences in the types of 
plaintiffs and categories of cases involved in these forums, it may make more sense to view 
these results as descriptions of two different dispute resolution systems rather than as a 
matched arbitration-litigation comparison. Of additional interest in this study is the finding that 
the 125 trials represent only 3.8 percent of the employment discrimination claims filed in the 
Southern District of New York over this period,63 reflecting the reality of the litigation pyramid 
in which relatively few cases survive preliminary dismissal proceedings and settlement efforts 
to ultimately reach trial.64 This is not to say, however, that a high settlement rate is necessarily 
                                                     
 61. Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Do 
Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, 6 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 1, 8-10 (2003), available at 
<http://www.arbforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2003DelikatKleinerConflictManag
ement.pdf>. 
 62. Id. at 10. 
 63. Id. at 8-9. 
 64. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 432-37, 451-52, 455-57 (2004). 
a bad feature of a dispute resolution system and indeed high rates of voluntarily negotiated 
settlements between parties can be a desirable outcome. 
 Although these last two studies make for interesting comparisons of arbitration and 
litigation outcomes, it is important to note that differences in employee win rates may reflect 
factors other than the relative employee or employer favorability of the decision-making 
process in each forum. In particular, there may be selection effects depending on the relative 
incentives for bringing cases to trial in each type of forum. For example, if litigation is viewed by 
potential claimants as a high-risk, high reward process, with large variation in award amounts, 
then employees may be willing to bring more marginal cases to trial even if the chance of 
winning is low, out of hope of winning a large verdict on the chance that they are successful. 
Conversely, simpler, faster procedures and resulting lower attorney fees may allow employees 
to bring lower value claims through arbitration than would be possible in litigation. The sample 
of actual cases that we observe are heavily influenced by the selection effect resulting from the 
calculations of the parties as to whether it is worth proceeding to trial in the forum. In addition, 
the greater availability of preliminary proceedings in litigation may lead to more of the marginal 
cases being dismissed before trial in litigation compared arbitration, resulting in higher 
litigation win rates.65 However, it should also be recognized that failure of the employer to 
obtain dismissal of a case in preliminary proceedings in litigation may result in settlement of the 
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case on terms favorable to the employee, which would tend to depress the employee win rate 
in litigation by removing some of the stronger cases before trial.66 
 What does analysis of the AAA C-filings data indicate about the question of employee 
win rates? Among the 836 employment arbitration awards in the sample I examined, the 
employee win rate was 19.7 percent. This figure was based on a relatively broad definition of 
an employee win as any case in which the employee was awarded some amount of damages, 
however large or small. This employee win rate is strikingly lower than that found in many of 
the previous studies of employment arbitration discussed above, such as the 39.7 and 43.6 
percent employee win rates found by Bingham and Hill respectively. It is also substantially 
lower than the employee win rates in employment discrimination litigation of 36.4 percent for 
federal courts and 43.8 percent for state courts found in the Eisenberg & Hill study67 and 33.6 
percent for the S.D.N.Y. in the Delikat and Kleiner study,68 discussed above. However, it is closer 
to the 26.2 percent employee win rate in the smaller subsample of employment discrimination 
based arbitration cases in the Eisenberg and Hill study69 and the 21.3 percent employee win 
rate Bingham found for arbitrations based on clauses included in personnel manuals.70 The 
similarity with these latter two results suggests that the explanation for the dramatically lower 
employee win rates in the AAA C-filings data compared to previous studies may lie in the types 
of cases involved. Many of the earlier studies of arbitration outcomes were based on sets of 
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arbitration awards that included large numbers of cases deriving from individually negotiated 
contracts and involving contractual rather than discrimination based claims.71 By contrast, the 
AAA C-filings under the California state law requirement include only cases based on employer 
promulgated agreements.72 The result is that this data better reflects the more fully developed 
Gilmer-based system of employment arbitration deriving from employer promulgated 
agreements, rather than arbitration involving individually negotiated agreements, which may 
have very different characteristics. 
 The AAA C-filings data unfortunately includes only limited information about the specific 
nature of the claims involved in the cases. However, it does include data on the salary levels of 
claimants, which provides some clue as to the type of employees involved in most of these 
recent cases. Among 1,009 cases in which employee salary data was provided, including cases 
that settled prior to hearings, 841 or 83.3 percent, involved employees earning $100,000 or less 
per year, whereas 128 or 12.7 percent involved employees earning between $100,000 and 
$250,000 and 40 or 4.0 percent involved employees earning over $250,000.73 This indicates 
that the large majority of these employment arbitration cases are not involving highly paid 
employees. It should be noted that the relatively lower salary levels of plaintiffs could also be 
an indicator of relative accessibility of employment arbitration. As Estreicher has argued, one of 
the key potential advantages of employment arbitration over litigation is that the relatively high 
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costs of litigation inhibit access to the courts by lower to mid-income ranges employees.74 
Eisenberg and Hill suggest that for employees below around the $60,000 income level 
employment arbitration is a plausible dispute resolution option, whereas litigation is not.75 The 
generally lower income levels of plaintiffs in the AAA C-filings data are consistent with this 
argument. 
B. Damages 
 It is an old legal adage that without a remedy there is no right. One of the main 
criticisms leveled at employment arbitration is that even when employees are successful 
arbitrators will not award damages similar to those that the employee would have obtained 
through litigation. There are two aspects to this comparison. First is the question of how typical 
awards in arbitration compare to typical awards in litigation. Second is the question of how the 
distribution of award amounts in arbitration compares to that in litigation. One of the striking 
outcomes of litigation is that there are a small number of very large verdicts, producing a highly 
skewed distribution of damage awards, indicated by large differences between mean (average) 
and median (typical) awards.76 For critics of litigation this represents the danger of a system in 
which runaway juries can be convinced to award mega-verdicts disproportionate to any actual 
harm done. For advocates, the threat of the mega-verdict is a key element in the system 
influencing employer behavior through deterrence of illegal conduct even if the actual number 
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of cases is relatively small.77 A common view of arbitration is that arbitrators are less likely to 
award extremely large damages compared to juries in litigation. Depending on one's 
perspective, this could serve to either dampen unjustifiable extreme outcomes or to undermine 
the deterrent effect that makes the litigation system effective.78 
 What does the empirical research tell us about damages awarded in employment 
arbitration? Some of the studies that examined employee win rates also looked at damage 
awards. In her study of AAA employment arbitration awards from 1993 to 1995, Bingham found 
a mean award to employees of $49,03079 ($64,612 in 2005 dollars),80 with a standard deviation 
of $188,29981 ($248,143 in 2005 dollars). It is important to note that her calculation of the 
mean (average) award included the cases employers won, resulting in zero damages for these 
cases.82 Limiting the analysis to only those cases where the employee won some damages 
produces a mean damage award of $94,288 ($124,254 in 2005 dollars) for Bingham's sample. It 
should be noted, as discussed above, that this early 1990s AAA sample included a relatively 
larger number of individually negotiated contract based cases where the employees were likely 
to be higher earners, increasing the potential damages.83 Bingham also calculated the 
proportion of damages demanded by employees that were awarded by arbitrators.84 She found 
that overall employees on average received 25 percent of the amount they demanded, or 48 
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percent on average of the amount demanded if we only consider employees who received 
some amount of damages.85 
 In their study of securities industry employment arbitration awards, Delikat and Kleiner 
also examined damage awards.86 Among the 186 arbitration awards from 1997 to 2001 in their 
sample, they found a median damage award for prevailing claimants of $100,000 ($117,227 in 
2005 dollars) and a mean damage award of $236,292 ($276,998 in 2005 dollars).87 By 
comparison, among the 125 employment discrimination trials from 1997 to 2001 in the 
Southern District of New York that they examined, the median damage award was $95,554 
($112,015 in 2005 dollars) and the mean damage award was $377,030 ($441,981 in 2005 
dollars).88 Taking the approach used by Bingham of including the zero recovery cases in the 
calculation of the mean damage award89 narrows the difference between arbitration and 
litigation outcomes for this study. Calculated across all cases, including those where no 
damages were recovered, the mean damage awards were $108,694 ($127,419 in 2005 dollars) 
for the securities industry arbitration cases and $126,682 ($148,505 in 2005 dollars) for the 
S.D.N.Y. employment discrimination trials. In both samples, the much higher mean than median 
award amounts indicates that the distribution is skewed by a relatively small number of large 
damage awards. The comparison also indicates that whereas typical awards in the two samples 
are very similar, the distribution of the litigation awards is more strongly skewed by a small 
number of large awards than is the arbitration sample. As noted above, however, it is not clear 
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whether these samples involve comparable cases. In particular, individuals employed in the 
securities industry may have higher income levels, resulting in larger damage awards, and be 
more likely to be involved in contractual disputes rather than claims of employment 
discrimination. 
 A similar comparison of arbitration and litigation damage awards is made in the 2003 
study by Eisenberg and Hill.90 Among non-civil rights employment disputes decided in 1999 and 
2000 AAA arbitration cases, they find for forty-four cases involving individual negotiated 
agreements (with typically higher paid employees) a median award of $94,984 ($111,347 in 
2005 dollars) and a mean award of $211,720 ($248,193 in 2005 dollars, whereas for 26 cases 
involving employer promulgated agreements (with typically lower paid employees) they find a 
median award of $13,450 ($15,767 in 2005 dollars) and a mean award of $38,723 ($45,394 in 
2005 dollars).91 Although one would expect to find award amounts varying with income level 
given that this will directly impact the quantum of damages suffered, the low level of damages 
for cases involving employer promulgated agreements is nonetheless striking. Eisenberg and 
Hill argue, however, that employees in this category will often have lower income levels and 
would be unable in any event to bring their cases through the litigation system due to the small 
amount of potential damages involved and, as a result, the relatively small damage awards 
obtained through arbitration are better than receiving nothing.92 By way of comparison, in 
seventy-nine state court trials from 1996 involving non-civil rights employment disputes, they 
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find a median award of $68,737 ($85,560 in 2005 dollars) and a mean award of $462,307 
($575,453 in 2005 dollars).93 This is somewhat lower than the median award of $296,991 
($355,843 in 2005 dollars) that Oppenheimer found for sixty-nine common law discharge case 
verdicts in Cahfornia in 1998 and 1999, reflecting higher damage awards in that state.94 
Eisenberg and Hill also examined civil rights based claims in employment arbitration, however 
here their findings were limited by their only being eight civil rights based cases among the AAA 
awards from 1999 and 2000. Among these awards, they found a median and mean award of 
$32,500 ($38,099 in 2005 dollars) for claims under individually negotiated agreements and a 
median award of $56,096 ($65,760 in 2005 dollars) and a mean award of $259,795 ($304,550 in 
2005 dollars) for claims under employer promulgated agreements. By comparison, they found 
that among 408 federal court employment discrimination trials in 1999-2000, the median 
award was $150,500 ($176,426 in 2005 dollars) and the mean award was $336,291 ($394,223 in 
2005 dollars). Meanwhile, for 68 state court employment discrimination trials from 1996, they 
reported a median award of $206,976 ($257,632 in 2005 dollars) and a mean award of 
$478,488 ($595,594 in 2005 dollars).95 Similar to this result, Oppenheimer found a median 
award of $200,000 ($239,632 in 2005 dollars) in 136 employment discrimination case verdicts 
from 1998 and 1999 in California.96 Including the cases where there were no damages awarded, 
following the approach used by Bingham described above, the mean awards for Eisenberg and 
Hill's samples were $122,410 ($143,497 in 2005 dollars) in federal court trials and $209,578 
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($260,871 in 2005 dollars) in state court trials.97 As Eisenberg and Hill argue, it is important to 
separate out civil rights and non-civil rights claims due to the different character of the cases 
involved in each category and their results show some differences in the patterns of outcomes 
for the different categories of cases. However, arguably the most striking result of dividing the 
cases into these categories is the relatively small number of civil rights based claims in their 
AAA awards sample, whereas the proportion of civil rights based claims in employment 
litigation is much larger. 
 The data on litigation outcomes reflect the conventional wisdom that there are a small 
number of large verdicts, with the result that the studies find much higher mean than median 
award amounts. However, in litigation there also exists the ability to appeal the verdict and 
many larger damage awards are reduced on appeal. Even in the absence of an appellate 
hearing, the employer may be able to get the employee to accept a lower amount than the 
damages award in settlement to avoid the possibility of appeal. Lewis Maltby has estimated 
that this may reduce the amount ultimately received by employees from jury awards by half.98 
 What do the AAA C-filings data indicate on the question of the damages from 
employment arbitration? Including only cases in which the employee was awarded some 
amount of damages, out of 165 cases the median damage award was $40,624 and the mean 
award was $117,715. As with employee win rates, the outcomes for damage awards from the 
AAA C-filings data are substantially less favorable to employees than in many of the previous 
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studies. The relatively lower salary levels of employees involved in these cases, with 77.4 
percent of those receiving awards making less than $100,000 a year, are a factor likely to 
contribute to this difference in outcomes. When we include the cases where no damages were 
awarded in the calculation of the mean outcome, the mean award drops to $23,233, reflecting 
the relatively low employee win rate in these arbitration cases as well as the lower award 
amounts. This mean outcome is much lower than those found for federal and state court 
employment discrimination trials in the Eisenberg and Hill study described above, which is 
based on the best available data on employment litigation outcomes. Including the zero 
damage award cases, the mean arbitration award in the AAA C-filings cases is 16.2 percent of 
the mean award in federal court employment discrimination trials and only 8.9 percent of the 
mean award in state court employment discrimination trials. One should recognize that these 
are not identically matched samples, which may account for some part of the difference. The 
AAA C-filings cases may include some nondiscrimination cases where damages may be lower, 
which could be increasing the observed differences. Overall, however, the very large magnitude 
of the differences suggests that even taking these differences into account we are seeing major 
differences in the outcomes of arbitration and litigation in this area. If an employee is 
considering filing a case in arbitration or in the courts, these results indicate that the 
anticipated recovery, taking into account the likelihood of winning the case, will be much lower 
in arbitration than in litigation. 
C. Arbitrator Fees  
 An important due process issue in debates over employment arbitration has been 
whether employees are being required to pay a significant portion of arbitrator fees, which 
might serve as a barrier to access to the system. What does the empirical data tell us about 
arbitrator fees in employment arbitration? The AAA C-filings data include information on the 
allocation and amount of arbitrator fees. In 96.6 percent of the cases in this sample the 
employer paid 100 percent of the arbitrator fees. Although imposition of arbitrator fees on 
employees is an important issue in principle, these results suggest that it is in practice relatively 
rare. In this respect, we are likely seeing the impact of key legal decisions on this topic, 
particularly the longer term effect of Cole v. Burns International Security Services,99 where 
concerns about imposition of substantial arbitrator fees on employees were most prominently 
raised. It should be noted however that this is a sample of AAA cases. It may be that practices 
such as imposition of arbitrator fees on employees in mandatory arbitration procedures are 
more common among arbitration cases that are not administered by major, reputable service 
providers. Indeed we know relatively little about the world of such ad hoc arbitrations beyond 
the occasional court case involving a challenge to one of these procedures.100  
 Beyond the allocation of arbitrator fees, another interesting issue is what the arbitrator 
fees are in employment arbitration. In her sample of 200 AAA awards from 1999 and 2000, Hill 
found median (typical) arbitrator fees of $2,712 ($3,179 in 2005 dollars) and mean (average) 
fees of $4,159 ($4,875 in 2005 dollars).101 
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 In the AAA C-filings, the median arbitrator fee among all cases was $2,472 and the mean 
fee was $6,105. However, this includes cases that were settled at some point in the 
proceedings. Among cases that involved a hearing and an award, the median arbitrator fee was 
$6,710 and the mean fee was $10,351. As with damage awards, the distribution of arbitrator 
fees was skewed by a small number of cases with relatively large fees. In particular, at the 
upper end of the distribution, in 5 percent of the cases, arbitrator fees were over 
$40,000.  
D. Time to Hearing  
 An advantage of arbitration compared to litigation that has been widely acknowledged 
is the relatively speedy time to hearing and a final decision in arbitration cases. The empirical 
research confirms the relative efficiency of employment arbitration in this regard. Eisenberg 
and Hill found that the mean time to final disposition for 172 noncivil-rights-based AAA 
employment arbitration cases in 1999-2000 was 250 days, whereas the mean time to final 
disposition for 170 non civil rights based state court cases from 1996 was 723 days.102 Similarly, 
whereas the mean time to final disposition for forty-two civil rights based AAA employment 
arbitration cases in 1999-2000 was 276 days, the mean time to final disposition was 709 days 
for 1,430 federal court employment discrimination cases from 1999-2000 and 818 days for 
163 state court employment discrimination cases from 1996.103  
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 In their study of securities industry arbitration, Delikat and Kleiner also find a speed 
advantage to arbitration over litigation, though the difference is of smaller magnitude than in 
Eisenberg and Hill's study.104 Whereas the median time from filing to judgment in securities 
industry employment arbitration cases was 16.5 months, with a mean time of 20.5 months, in 
employment discrimination cases in the Southern District of New York the median time from 
filing to judgment was twenty-five months and the mean time was 28.5 months.105  
 The results from the AAA C-filings data also suggest shorter time periods to obtain a 
hearing in arbitration than is typical in litigation. Among 849 cases that involved an award, the 
mean time to a decision was 332.2 days. It is noteworthy that whereas in other respects the 
California-AAA filings suggest a different set of characteristics to the emerging system of 
employment arbitration than the earlier studies, they confirm the relative speed of 
employment arbitration for obtaining a hearing compared to the litigation system.  
 In general, faster proceedings will be to the advantage of an employee claimant in an 
employment dispute.106 If the employee has lost his or her job and potentially had to take 
alternative employment at a lower salary level, the longer it takes to receive compensation, the 
greater will be the personal economic impact of the loss. However it should also be recognized 
that even with the relatively shorter time period to resolve disputes in arbitration, at around a 
year, the time elapsed since the employment dispute arose will be such that a continuation of 
the employment relationship will be increasingly unlikely even if the employee is successful in 
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arbitration. The greater speed of arbitration is clearly an advantage for employment disputes 
compared to litigation, but it is still not clear that it is fast enough to produce effective 
remedies for many employees.  
E. Repeat-Player Effect Studies  
 An issue that has received particular attention in empirical research on employment 
arbitration is the question of whether there is a repeat player bias. The concept of repeat 
player bias is that a party that participates in a conflict resolution process multiple times, the 
"repeat player," will have an advantage over a party that only participates in it a single time, the 
"one shot player." More specifically with regard to employment arbitration, the concern has 
been raised that some employers will have an advantage as repeat players because they are 
likely to participate in multiple employment arbitration cases whereas almost all employees will 
be likely to be one shot players in employment arbitration, only ever participating in a single 
case. Given that employment arbitrators rely on being selected to decide cases for their 
livelihood, the danger is that arbitrators will have a bias in favor of the repeat player employer 
in the hope of being selected by the employer to hear future cases. By contrast, in labor 
arbitration repeat player bias is avoided because both the employer and the union are repeat 
players and likely to be involved in future arbitrator selection decisions.  
 The first empirical evidence suggesting a concern about repeat player bias in 
employment arbitration came from a series of studies conducted by Lisa Bingham in the 
1990s.107 In a study of 203 AAA employment arbitration awards from 1993 to 1995, Bingham 
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found that employers who participated in multiple arbitration cases were significantly more 
likely to win their cases than employers who only participated in a single case. Whereas for this 
type of repeat-player employer the employee win rate was only 23.3 percent, for the non-
repeat-player employer the employee win rate was 67.0 percent.108 While this result is 
consistent with a repeat-player bias, it could also be that employers who are involved in 
multiple cases could have other advantages than arbitrator bias, such as greater familiarity and 
expertise in dealing with the arbitral forum. To more directly test for repeat-player bias, in the 
same study Bingham looked at situations where the employer was involved in more than one 
case before the same arbitrator. She found that in these repeat-employer/repeat arbitrator 
cases, the employee win rate was 25 percent, which was significantly lower than the employee 
win rate of 55.5 percent in other cases.109 
 The repeat player effect question was also examined by Elizabeth Hill in her sample of 
200 AAA employment arbitration awards from 1999-2000.110 She found that in her sample of 
awards only two cases featured the same employer and arbitrator combination, making it 
impossible to investigate the question of a repeat employer/repeat-arbitrator bias statistically. 
However, there were thirty-four cases in her sample involving a repeat-player employer, i.e. 
one that was involved in more than one case in the sample. Similar to Bingham's results. Hill 
found a lower employee win rate where a repeat-player employer was involved in the case. Hill 
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argued that there was an alternative explanation for this finding other than repeat-player bias. 
She argued that there was an "appellate effect" in which the repeat-player employers tended 
to be larger companies with well-developed internal dispute resolution procedures that filtered 
out and resolved meritorious cases before they got to arbitration, leaving only the weaker 
employee cases to go to arbitration. In support of this argument, she noted that in twenty-five 
of the thirty-four repeat-player cases the employer had an in-house dispute resolution program 
and that in these cases the employer win-loss ratio was 3.2:1. By contrast, in the remaining nine 
repeat-player cases where the employer did not have an in-house program, the employer win-
loss ratio was only 1.25:1, similar to the employer win-loss ratio of 1.3:1 in the non-repeat-
player cases. Based on this evidence. Hill concluded that the repeat-player employer advantage 
was due to the internal procedures, not due to arbitrator bias.111 Hill did not provide any tests 
of the statistical significance of the difference between the in-house program and no in-house 
program groups, however a simple chi-square test on the results presented indicates that the 
difference is not statistically significant.112 Of course, the lack of statistical significance does not 
mean there is no difference, merely that the evidence is not conclusive either way. An 
additional piece of information that would have strengthened the evidence for this argument is 
the rate of success for non-repeat-player employers that had internal dispute resolution 
procedures; however, this is not reported in Hill's study. 
 I have some sympathy for the appellate effect theory, having myself also advanced the 
argument that employment arbitration often serves as an appellate stage of review for multi-
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step internal dispute resolution procedures.113 My own research has shown that employees 
tend to make greater use of internal dispute resolution procedures that feature employment 
arbitration as the final appeal step compared to procedures that do not feature this final 
step.114 In my organizational case study based research, I have also found examples of systems 
that appear to be filtering out some of the more meritorious claims by identifying and resolving 
them at earlier stages in the procedure, particularly through the use of mediation as a 
settlement stage prior to arbitration.115 However, I do not think the evidence yet shows that 
this explains the repeat-player employer effect. In particular, we do not yet have direct 
evidence indicating that the cases going to arbitration out of internal procedures are actually 
weaker. More generally, even if it can be shown that there is an appellate effect, we should not 
jump to the conclusion that this is the entire explanation for the repeat-player employer effect. 
In practice, there may be multiple factors involved. One could be arbitrator bias in favor of the 
repeat-player employer. So far, the evidence indicating such bias is relatively limited, though 
suggestive enough in this direction to warrant further investigation. It is also possible that other 
processes could be involved in producing the repeat-player employer effect. One possibility is 
that there may an experience effect in which employers who are repeatedly involved in 
arbitration develop greater expertise in regard to the forum and this puts them at advantage. 
 What do the AAA C-filings data tell us about the possible existence of a repeat employer 
or a repeat employer-arbitrator effect? In the sample, a relatively high proportion of cases 
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(1,751 out of 2,763 cases, or 63.4 percent) involved employers who were involved in more than 
one arbitration cases. This is unsurprising given that larger employers who have adopted 
employment arbitration procedures are quite likely to be involved in multiple cases. Usually a 
procedure will designate a particular arbitration service provider and so with a comprehensive 
set of cases from a service provider we should expect to see many repeat employer cases. As 
with the previous studies, analysis of the AAA C-filings data shows that repeat employers, i.e. 
those involved in more than one case, tend to be more successful than one-shot employers. 
Out of the sample of 836 awards, the employee win rate was 32.0 percent for one-shot 
employers versus 13.9 percent for repeat employers, which was a statistically significant 
difference (Chi-squared(l)=37.47, p<0.001). There was a similar difference in award amounts, 
with an average damage award (including zero damage award cases) of $41,199 for one-shot 
employers versus $14,710 for repeat employers, which was also a statistically significant 
difference (p<.001). As discussed above, however, we cannot know from this result which of 
the possible explanations of the repeat employer effect explains these differences. 
 The AAA C-filings data also allows testing of whether there is a repeat employer-
arbitrator effect where the employer does better if it uses the same arbitrator in more that one 
case. Out of the same sample of 836 awards, employees won only fourteen out of the 124 cases 
(11.3 percent) involving a repeat employer-arbitrator pair, compared to 151 out of the 712 
cases (21.2 percent) that did not involve a repeat employer-arbitrator pair, which was a 
statistically significant difference (Chi-squared(l)=6.56, p<0.01). Similarly for damage awards, 
the mean award for cases involving repeat employer-arbitrator pairs, at $7,183, was 
significantly lower (p<.10) than the mean award for other cases, at $26,029. To make a 
narrower comparison, if we look at just repeat player employers, the employee win rate of 11.3 
percent where there was a repeat employer-arbitrator pairing was lower than the employee 
win rate of 14.7 percent for non-repeat pairings, but this difference is not statistically 
significant. Similarly, the mean award of $7183 for repeat employer-arbitrator pairs was 
substantially lower than the mean award of $16,816 for other cases involving repeat 
employers, but this difference was also not statistically significant. So whereas we can be 
confident that employees do worse with a repeat employer-arbitrator than in cases in general, 
we cannot statistically reject the possibility that random chance explains employees fairing 
worse with repeat employer-arbitrator pairings than with repeat employers in general. Thus, 
although these results suggest a repeat player effect, we cannot rule out the lower win rate in 
these cases being a result of other effects associated with the repeat employer phenomenon. 
However, it is important to remember that the finding of a lack of statistical significance is not a 
finding of the lack of an effect. The best estimate based on this data is that employees fair 
worse where there is a repeat employer-arbitrator pairing than when there is simply a repeat 
employer; however, we would need a larger sample size to be statistically confident of this 
conclusion. 
 On measuring the repeat employer-arbitrator effect, Sherwyn, Estreicher, and Heise 
raise some interesting methodological issues.116 One is whether the first time the employer-
arbitrator pair is involved in a case it should be coded as a repeat employer-arbitrator case. 
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They argue it should not given that at that point it is not know for certain whether this 
employer-arbitrator pairing will be repeated. However, subsequent selection of the arbitrator 
by this employer will be based in part on how the arbitrator decided this first case. If there is a 
repeat employer-arbitrator effect we would expect arbitrators in these first cases to be issuing 
more employer-favorable decisions in hope of being selected in future cases. So, if in fact such 
an effect does exist, we would expect to see it reflected in the first as well as subsequent cases 
involving the employer-arbitrator pairing, which is the approach I have taken in analyzing the 
AAA C-filings data. 
 A factor that should reduce the likelihood of a repeat employer-arbitrator effect 
emerging is the potential role of plaintiff's counsel as a repeat player in the system. Although 
individual employees will almost always be one-shot players in employment arbitration, 
plaintiff’s counsel will generally be involved in multiple cases. Given the availability of 
information about the arbitrators on the list for selection, plaintiff's counsel should be able to 
ensure that overly employer-favorable arbitrators are not repeatedly selected. The ability to do 
this will be enhanced where the arbitration service provider supplies information about past 
decisions of the potential arbitrator in accordance with the Due Process Protocol. This should 
be the situation for the arbitration cases in the AAA C-filings dataset and the filings themselves 
should also assist plaintiff's counsel in identifying potential arbitrator bias. 
F. Employee Self-Representation 
 Representation of employees by counsel plays an important role in ensuring due 
process in employment arbitration. As discussed, plaintiff's counsel can play an important role 
in arbitrator selection, reducing the danger of repeat player bias emerging. More generally, 
representation by counsel increases the effectiveness of presentation of the employee's case 
and helps ensure that procedural fairness is observed in the hearing of the case. There has been 
limited research to date on the role of plaintiff's counsel in employment arbitration. Hill 
compared employee win rates for claims based on employer promulgated agreements and 
found a 34.6 percent win rate for employees represented by an attorney versus a 32.5 percent 
win rate for unrepresented employees, which was not a statistically significant difference.117 
 The AAA C-filings provide some evidence in this regard by including information on 
whether the employee was self-represented. Overall in the sample of 2,760 cases, employees 
were represented in 2,066 cases (74.9 percent) and self-represented in 694 cases (25.1 
percent). The fact that employees are able to bring many cases without representation suggests 
on the positive side that employment arbitration is accessible in this manner. On the other 
hand, it raises the concern that many employees may not have enough access to 
representation to ensure that their legal rights are properly recognized. Employment 
arbitration may be relatively accessible to self-represented employees since under procedures 
where the employer is paying the arbitrator fees, employees do not have to pay any significant 
amounts to file a claim. By contrast, employees will generally have to pay for their own 
representation. In litigation, plaintiff's counsels are typically willing to represent employees 
under contingency fee arrangements. It is unclear to what degree counsel are willing to accept 
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employment arbitration cases on a contingency fee basis or if they are more likely to charge 
based on hourly fees and/or demand larger retainers before accepting cases. 
 The differences in mean outcomes between arbitration and litigation discussed above 
are likely to have a major impact on the ability of employees to obtain representation by 
counsel. Under a contingency fee arrangement where plaintiff's counsel receives a percentage 
of the damages if any are recovered but nothing if zero damages are awarded, counsel will have 
to take into account both the chances of winning the case and the anticipated amount of 
damages if the case is won in calculating the likely outcome from taking the case. As a result, 
the key outcome of interest for plaintiff attorneys in considering case outcome likelihoods will 
be the mean damage awards in the system including the zero damage award cases. As 
discussed above, based on the best data available on employment discrimination trials, 
reported by Eisenberg and Hill,118 the mean award including zero damage cases was $122,410 
($143,497 in 2005 dollars) in federal court trials and $209,578 ($260,871 in 2005 dollars) in 
state court trials, but only $23,233 in the arbitration cases in the AAA C-filings data. This 
disparity in the anticipated outcomes between the systems is likely to reduce substantially the 
willingness and ability of plaintiff's counsel to represent employees in arbitration under 
contingency fee arrangements compared to litigation. 
 Representation by counsel appears to have an effect on case outcomes. Among 836 
awards in the AAA C-filings data, the employee win rate was 22.6 percent where represented 
by counsel and only 13.7 percent where the employee was self-represented, a statistically 
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significant difference (Chi-square(l)=9.16, p<0.01). The mean damage award for self-
represented employees, at $13,222, was also significantly lower (p<.05) than the mean award 
for employees represented by counsel, at $28,009. These differences may partly reflect the 
effectiveness of representation by counsel; however they also may reflect a case selection 
effect in that plaintiff’s counsel may be more likely to recognize when cases are too weak to 
justify bringing to an arbitration hearing. By contrast, self-represented employees may lack the 
legal knowledge or experience to recognize when a case is marginal or even hopeless, or for 
that matter may wish to proceed to a hearing in any event. 
 As discussed earlier, a major benefit of representation by counsel is reducing the danger 
of repeat player bias as experienced plaintiff counsel can themselves serve as repeat players in 
employment arbitration, identifying and preventing the selection of arbitrators with undue pro-
employer bias. To investigate this empirically using the AAA C-filings data, we can look at the 
relationship between representation and repeat employer-arbitrator pairings in affecting 
employee win rates. In cases involving employees who are represented by counsel, the 
employees won 115 out of 491 cases (a 23.4 percent win rate) where there was no repeat 
employer-arbitrator pairing, compared with thirteen out of seventy-five cases (a 17.3 percent 
win rate) where there was a repeat employer-arbitrator pairing, which was not a statistically 
significant difference. Among self-represented employees, the employees won thirty-six out of 
221 cases (a 16.3 percent win rate) where there was no repeat employer-arbitrator pairing, but 
only one out of forty-nine cases (a 2.0 percent win rate) where there was a repeat employer-
arbitrator pairing, which was a statistically significant difference (Chi-square(l)=6.89, p<0.01).119 
This last win rate for unrepresented employees whose cases are decided by arbitrators who are 
involved in multiple arbitration cases with that same employer is strikingly low and raises 
particular concerns about the danger of repeat player bias for the more vulnerable employee 
who does not have representation by counsel. 
 In general, representation of employees is an area that deserves greater attention in 
future empirical research. For example, one of the key features of the well-established system 
of labor arbitration is the structural role of the union in representing employees at all steps of 
the grievance procedure. One of the most important differences with grievance procedures in 
nonunionized workplaces is that these tend to lack similar structures of representation for 
employees in bringing cases. Plaintiff's counsels are playing an important role in representing 
employees in employment arbitration. However, it is worth considering whether there could be 
a broader system for representation for employees, perhaps including non-attorneys providing 
lower cost, more accessible assistance in nonunion grievance procedures prior to arbitration or 
in lower value cases in arbitration itself. 
G. Policy Capturing Experimental Designs 
 A fundamental problem in comparing the outcomes of employment arbitration and 
litigation is selection effects that produce different distributions of case types in each system. 
For example, if a higher quantum of damages is necessary to finance taking a case to litigation 
compared to arbitration, this will result in the litigation system having a relatively greater 
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proportion of cases with higher potential damages and as a result likely involving a higher 
proportion of employees with higher income levels. Conversely, one of the concerns with 
employment arbitration cases being heard in the securities industry system was that the typical 
arbitrator was an older white male who might be less sympathetic or sensitive to discrimination 
claims brought by younger female or minority claimants. This perception might result in a lower 
proportion of employment discrimination claims being brought in arbitration compared to in 
the litigation system. 
 To address the problem of case selection bias in comparisons between different dispute 
resolution systems, two important recent studies have used policy-capturing experimental 
designs to investigate the employment dispute decision-making process. In policy-capturing 
studies, hypothetical scenarios are presented to decision-makers, whose response to these 
scenarios is then examined statistically. Responses can be compared across different. Decision 
makers and variations on the hypothetical scenarios can be used to investigate the influence of 
different factors on the decision-making process. Policy-capturing studies are a well-developed 
research methodology in the field of psychology that has been used to investigate a number of 
employment related issues.120 
 In the first major policy-capturing study of employment arbitration. Lisa Bingham and 
Debra Mesch presented a sample of employment and labor arbitrators with a hypothetical 
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dismissal case.121 Of the participants in their study, 161 were National Academy of Arbitrators 
members who were labor arbitrators, 210 were other labor arbitrators, 188 were employment 
arbitrators who had been listed on the AAA commercial panel before the AAA Employment 
Disputes Panel was established, and 184 were students. The participants were asked to decide 
a hypothetical case that was based on actual unpublished arbitration case. Variations of the 
case presented to the participants included versions with male and female grievants and 
versions involving a labor arbitration setting and a nonunion employment arbitration setting.122 
Among the key findings from the study was that overall employment arbitrators were 
significantly less likely than labor arbitrators to order reinstatement or to award back pay when 
presented with the same hypothetical cases.123 However, when other arbitrator characteristics 
were included in the model, the differences were no longer statistically significant. Instead, 
arbitrator occupation was a significant predictor of outcomes, with attorney arbitrators 
significantly less likely to rule in favor of employees than full-time arbitrators or professors who 
were arbitrators.124 Since 80 percent of the employment arbitrators in their sample were 
attorneys, this is correlated with the overall lower employee win rate with employment 
arbitrators.125 This is not to say, however, that this finding renders the differences in outcomes 
unimportant, given that one of the concerns raised about employment arbitration is precisely 
the tendency for employment arbitrators to be employment attorneys, particularly those who 
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have focused on representing management and may tend to be more sympathetic to employer 
arguments. 
 In the second major policy-capturing study, Brian Klaas, Douglas Mahony, and Hoyt 
Wheeler adopted a similar approach to Bingham and Mesch, but extended it by including a 
more diverse set of decision-makers and using a broader range of alternative case scenarios.126 
In their sample, Klaas, Mahony, and Wheeler included: 140 employment arbitrators from the 
AAA employment arbitrators list; eighty-two labor arbitrators identified from the National 
Academy of Arbitrators directory; and eighty-three former jurors who had participated in 
Federal employment discrimination cases.127 Their sample of employment arbitrators was 
further divided by giving seventy-two the instruction that the arbitration agreement specified 
that statutory claims were to be submitted to arbitration and that the employer had an 
employment-at-will policy.128 The other sixty-eight employment arbitrators were given the 
instruction that the arbitration agreement provided that statutory claims had to be submitted 
to arbitration and terminations had to be "for-cause.”129 Participants in the study were asked to 
decide thirty-eight different hypothetical cases that included various different employee 
claimant and dispute characteristics.130 The first key finding from this study is that jurors and 
employment arbitrators, either with statutory-only or just-cause standard instructions, were 
significantly less likely to rule in favor of the employee than were labor arbitrators. Among the 
                                                     
 126. HOYT N. WHEELER ET AL., WORKPLACE JUSTICE WITHOUT UNIONS, 195(2004); see also Brian Klass et 
al., Decision-Making about Workplace Disputes: A Policy-Capturing Study of Employment Arbitrators, Labor 
Arbitrators and Jurors, 45 INDUS. REL. 68-95(2006). 
 127. WHEELER ET AL., supra note 126, at 195-96. 
 128. Id. at 195. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 196-207. 
other categories of decision-makers, jurors were significantly more likely to rule in favor of the 
employee than either group of employment arbitrators. Between the two groups of 
employment arbitrators, those who were given just-cause standard instructions were more 
likely to rule in favor of employees than those given statutory claim only instructions. Thus, 
employment arbitrators using statutory claim only instructions, the situation following from the 
Gilmer and Circuit City cases, were significantly less likely to rule in favor of employees than all 
the other categories of decision-makers examined in this study.131 
 The policy-capturing studies raise important concerns about the decision-making of 
employment arbitrators. It appears that employees are less likely to be successful when the 
same case is being decided by an employment arbitrator than by other decision-makers. Now, it 
is certainly possible to argue that labor arbitrators are overly generous to employees in their 
decision-making process and therefore we should not view negatively the lesser willingness of 
employment arbitrators to rule in favor of employees compared to labor arbitrators. However, 
the additional finding in Klaas, Mahony, and Wheeler's study that employment arbitrators are 
less likely to rule in favor of the employee than are members of juries from federal court 
employment discrimination cases, when presented with the same cases, raises the concern that 
employee cases will not receive similar consideration in arbitration and litigation. One still could 
argue that juries are overly receptive and favorable to employee claims in litigation, but these 
findings are more problematic if the argument in favor of employment arbitration is that 
employees will receive the same ability to have their claims heard in arbitration as they would 
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have in litigation, just in a different forum. These research findings suggest that this simple 
equation of the arbitration and litigation forums is not an accurate characterization. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
A. Employment Arbitration as a Step in the Organizational Dispute Resolution Processes 
 The empirical research described so far has examined employment arbitration as a 
dispute resolution procedure. The studies have investigated the process and outcomes of 
arbitration itself, as well as comparisons to the outcomes of the litigation process. These 
studies reflect the reality that employment arbitration was developed as and serves the 
function of an alternative to the litigation system for resolving employment law claims. Yet 
employment arbitration is also frequently adopted by organizations as part of their internal 
dispute resolution procedures used to resolve the conflicts that inevitably arise in work and 
employment relations.132 In addition to serving as the mechanism for resolving potential 
employment law claims, in this role employment arbitration serves as the final appeal stage for 
complaints or grievances brought by employees through the earlier stages in the internal 
procedures. For this reason, employment arbitration can also be viewed as part of what have 
been described as Organizational Dispute Resolution (ODR) systems, including various other 
dispute resolution procedures the organization may have adopted, such as peer review panels, 
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internal or external mediation, management appeal boards, or ombudspersons.133 Where 
employment arbitration is introduced as the final step in an ODR system for nonunion 
employees, it is fulfilling a structural role more akin to that of labor arbitration in the grievances 
of union procedures. Although we should not jump to the conclusion that employment 
arbitration does, or perhaps even should, function similarly to labor arbitration, this shift in 
perspective poses different questions about how we evaluate the operation and impact of 
employment arbitration. While the research in this area is more limited, some studies have 
begun to address these issues. 
 How often are employment arbitration procedures introduced in conjunction with other 
elements of ODR systems, as opposed to as Stand-alone procedures? Data from a 2003 survey 
of establishments in the telecommunications industry that I conducted with Rosemary Batt, 
Harry Katz, and Jeffrey Keefe provide some evidence on this question.134 As noted earlier, in 
that study 14.1 percent of the establishments had mandatory employment arbitration 
procedures. Of those establishments that had employment arbitration, 90 percent also had 
some type of formal internal grievance procedure for nonunion employees. Notably, this rate 
was significantly greater than the 68 percent of establishments without employment arbitration 
that also had internal grievance procedures.135 This suggests both that employment arbitration 
is most commonly operating in conjunction with other elements of an ODR system and that it is 
associated with a greater likelihood of having adopted formal internal dispute resolution 
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procedures. One reason for this positive association between employment arbitration and 
internal dispute resolution procedures may be that the adoption of employment arbitration 
serves as an impetus for a general re-evaluation of dispute resolution procedures by the 
organization.136  
 How does the adoption of employment arbitration in conjunction with internal dispute 
resolution procedures affect the operation of each of these parts of an ODR system? Some 
research has examined the impact of the existence of internal procedures in the organization 
on the outcomes of arbitration. As discussed above. Hill found that employee win rates in 
arbitration were lower where the employer had some type of internal grievance procedure 
steps prior to arbitration.137 She ascribed this reduced employee win rate to more meritorious 
claims being resolved at earlier stages in these procedures, leaving only the weaker claims to 
proceed to arbitration. 
 Sherwyn, Estreicher, and Heise examine data on the operation of an internal dispute 
resolution procedure culminating in employment arbitration as its final step that was adopted 
by a major employer in the restaurant industry.138 They find that the large majority of 
complaints brought through this internal dispute resolution procedure were resolved quickly, 
with 81 percent being resolved in less than a week.139 They also report that less than 5 percent 
of complaints ultimately resulted in arbitration. Importantly, over 75 percent of employees who 
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used this system remained employed with the same firm after the case was resolved.140 This is 
a significant outcome since a weakness of the litigation system is that cases tend to be brought 
after dismissals and it is relatively rare that the employment relationship can be continued after 
the case is resolved.141 
 The patterns of usage described by Sherwyn, Estreicher and Heise are similar to the 
findings reported in my own study of the dispute resolution procedures used by TRW, which 
had also received prominent attention when profiled in a GAO report.142 The employment 
arbitration procedure adopted at TRW was unusual in that it was nonbinding for the employee, 
allowing appeal to the courts if the employee was dissatisfied with the decision at arbitration. 
However, in practice relatively few complaints proceeded to the arbitration stage due to the 
highly developed internal dispute resolution procedure used at the company. This procedure 
included a number of steps prior to arbitration, including external mediation as the step prior to 
arbitration. Mediation was highly successful, with the majority of the cases that reached this 
step being settled prior to arbitration.143 Notably in this system as well an important outcome 
was that a high proportion of complaints were resolved with continued employment of the 
complainant, an outcome that is rare in litigation and perhaps also relatively uncommon in 
employment arbitration itself. One of the interesting issues that arose in the TRW case study 
was the question of representation of employees. Once complaints reached the external 
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mediation step representation of employees by attorneys was common, with about half of the 
employees having counsel. Interestingly, a number of other complainants also brought non-
attorney representatives to mediation and to other steps in the procedures. Some of these 
non-attorney representatives included friends or family of the complainant, but sometimes also 
included company human resource representatives acting on the employee's behalf.144 In the 
context of a legal proceeding, this type of representative might seem unusual and/or 
inappropriate, however in the context of an internal conflict management process they may 
perform a useful function. To the degree that a complaint is concerned with internal 
organizational processes, then these types of representatives may be relatively effective at 
articulating an employee's needs and achieving a resolution that involves a successful 
continued employment relationship with the organization. 
 Some broader evidence of the impact of employment arbitration on internal dispute 
resolution procedures is provided by a study in which I analyzed usage of procedures among 
establishments in the telecommunications industry.145 In this study, I compared usage and 
outcomes of grievance procedures in unionized and nonunion workplaces. Among the 
nonunion workplaces, I distinguished between procedures that included employment 
arbitration as a final step, those that used peer review (constituting another type of non-
managerial decision-maker), and other nonunion grievance procedures. The results of this 
study showed significant impacts of use of employment arbitration as the final step on the 
operation of internal grievance procedures in nonunion workplaces. Whereas nonunion 
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grievance procedures that featured employment arbitration as a final step had an average 
grievance rate of 3.2 grievances annually per 100 employees and on average 34 percent of 
disciplinary decisions being grieved, other nonunion procedures had an average grievance rate 
of only 1.3 per 100 employees and only 11 percent of disciplinary decisions on average being 
grieved.146 Interestingly, whereas in unionized workplaces both average grievance rates, at 5.3 
per 100 employees, and percentages of disciplinary decisions grieved, at 55 percent, were 
higher, in nonunion procedures using peer review the grievance rate, at 2.9 per 100 employees, 
and the percentage of discipline grieved, at 30 percent, were similar to those of nonunion 
procedures ending in employment arbitration. 
 In this study, employee win rates across the four different categories of procedures 
were less different than might be expected: 36.4 percent in unionized workplaces; 36.4 percent 
in nonunion procedures with employment arbitration; 30.0 percent in nonunion procedures 
with peer review panels; and 46.4 percent in other nonunion procedures.147 One should be 
cautious however in drawing too Strong a conclusion from these simple employee win rate 
comparisons, since they do not reflect differences in judgments by employees about whether it 
is worthwhile to file a grievance. If the employees perceive that a grievance procedure is one 
with relatively weak due process protections and a high risk of retaliation against complainants, 
they may be unwilling to lodge a grievance unless they have a particularly strong, clear-cut 
case. By contrast, under procedures that provide better protections against retaliation and 
stronger due process features, employees may be more willing to file weaker cases with less 
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compelling supporting evidence. Adjusting the win rates to account for the likelihood of filing a 
grievance yields a different picture. Across the four different categories of procedures, the 
percentages of all disciplinary decisions that were subsequently overturned through grievances 
filed by employees were: 17.3 percent in unionized workplaces; 11.1 percent under nonunion 
procedures with employment arbitration; 9.9 percent under nonunion procedures with peer 
review panels; and 2.7 percent under other nonunion grievance procedures.148 
 The key conclusion in regard to employment arbitration is that use of it as the final step 
of internal grievance procedures in nonunion workplaces is associated with greater usage of the 
procedures by employees and a greater likelihood of getting managerial disciplinary decisions 
reversed than under other types of nonunion procedures. This does not mean that employment 
arbitration itself is directly responsible for this effect. It could be that organizations are more 
likely to upgrade their nonunion internal grievance procedures when they are adopting 
employment arbitration and that it is these enhanced internal dispute resolution procedures 
that are responsible for the improved outcomes for employees. This effect was what I found in 
my case study research at TRW and some other organizations that had adopted employment 
arbitration.149 This suggests a more complex picture in which the spread of employment 
arbitration may be associated with a general strengthening of internal dispute resolution 
procedures in nonunion workplaces, however the use of employment arbitration itself as the 
final step is not necessarily what is having the direct impact on the operation of these 
procedures. 
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B. Employment Arbitration and HR Outcomes 
 How do prospective employees view the adoption of mandatory employment 
arbitration policies by potential employers? In their general survey of worker attitudes towards 
representation and participation, Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers presented evidence 
suggesting that arbitration was viewed favorably in comparison to litigation as a method of 
resolving employment disputes.150 While this result suggests interest in arbitration as a general 
concept, the initial description of employment arbitration in their survey did not indicate that it 
was mandatory and was arguably couched in relatively positive terms which may have induced 
positive responses. Interestingly, when Freeman and Rogers conducted a follow-up survey 
asking more specific questions about what characteristics workers would like to see in an 
arbitration system, 78 percent responded that the system should not bar employees from going 
to court, but rather allow them to go to court or arbitration.151 In addition, 95 percent of 
respondents felt that the system should be set up jointly by employees and management and 
82 percent felt the system should provide expert advice/assistance to employees.152 What the 
Freeman and Rogers results indicate is openness among workers to arbitration as an alternative 
to the litigation system for resolving employment disputes, but also a desire for a system with 
characteristics that differ in some important respects from the current system of employment 
arbitration. 
 Two other studies have investigated the impact of mandatory arbitration on potential 
job applicants. In two rounds of an experimental study, Richey, Bernardin, Tyler, and McKinney 
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presented groups of students with alternative dispute resolution policy statements from a firm 
and investigated the impact of variations in the policy on applicant intentions toward the firm 
as a potential employer.153 In the first phase of the study involving 124 students, the presence 
or absence of a policy involving voluntary, nonbinding arbitration had no significant impact on 
intentions toward a potential employer. However, in the second phase of the study involving 
273 student participants, the presence of mandatory and binding characteristics to the 
arbitration policy was associated with less favorable intentions toward the firm as a potential 
employer.154 
 Mahony, Klaas, McClendon, and Varma looked at the impact on job applicants of 
mentioning a mandatory arbitration policy in employment brochures.155 They had 389 
professional and executive MBA students read simulated employment brochures, which 
contained mention of one of a series of different types of procedures.156 They found that the 
participants viewed the attractiveness of these potential employers as higher where they had 
voluntary as opposed to mandatory arbitration procedures and where the procedures had 
higher rather than lower due process protections.157 The due process features of procedures 
were found to be of greater concern to applicants where the procedure in question was 
mandatory.158 In addition, existence of mandatory arbitration procedures was viewed more 
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negatively by minority participants, suggesting potentially greater concerns about diminution of 
civil rights protections.159 
 The context presented in these experimental studies is somewhat artificial in that it is 
unlikely that a potential employer would give such prominence to an employment arbitration 
procedure in an employment brochure, as opposed to presenting the procedure to employees 
at the hiring point. However, they do provide some additional insight into the views of potential 
employees on the characteristics of different types of dispute resolution procedures where 
these are presented to them for their evaluation. The results suggest that while employees may 
be open to arbitration as a mechanism for resolving employment disputes, the present 
common form of employment arbitration as a mandatory, binding procedure is not yet 
something that has received general acceptance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
What does the body of empirical research on employment arbitration conducted to date 
suggest about the characteristics of this rising system of employment dispute resolution? First, 
the evidence suggests that employment arbitration has expanded since its introduction to 
cover a substantial and growing segment of the workforce. Perhaps most indicative of the 
significance of employment arbitration for the nature of employment relations are the 
indications that this system of dispute resolution now likely covers more workers than union 
representation in the United States. 
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 Second, the empirical research on outcomes of employment arbitration suggests 
changing patterns over time. The initial body of research tended to show relative similarity in 
outcomes between employment arbitration and litigation in the areas of employee win rates 
and damages awarded. However, the more recent data on cases deriving from employer-
promulgated agreements in the AAA C-filings dataset suggest that employee win rates and 
damage awards are lower than indicated by the earlier studies and lower than those in 
litigation. There is still a danger of comparing apples and oranges in comparing litigation and 
arbitration outcomes given that the types of cases that reach hearings in each system may 
differ and the greater prevalence of employer success in preliminary dismissals and appeals of 
cases in litigation. However, recent studies using more sophisticated policy-capturing 
methodologies that control for the type of case decision-makers are presented with, ensuring 
an apples to apples comparison, have found lower likelihoods of employment arbitrators ruling 
in favor of employees than other decision-makers when presented with the same cases. 
 The area of greatest due process concern emerging from analysis of the AAA C-filings 
data are the significantly lower employee win rates where the employee is unrepresented and 
there is a repeat employer-arbitrator pairing. These employees are in the most potentially 
vulnerable position from a due process perspective and the results indicate that they 
experience the least favorable outcomes from employment arbitration. By contrast, one area 
where the empirical research is relatively consistent is in indicating the speediness of 
employment arbitration compared to litigation. That said, at a little under a year, the typical 
time to a hearing in employment arbitration may still be too slow for most employment 
disputes, where time is at a premium in attempting to effectively resolve the dispute with at 
least the hope of a continuation of the employment relationship. In this respect, the research 
showing the potential efficacy of internal dispute resolution procedures, including those 
involving steps such as mediation prior to employment arbitration, suggest a focus on the 
enhancement of these procedures as a route to more effective workplace dispute resolution. 
 Lastly, it should be noted that the results from analysis of the AAA C-filings data 
represent cases handled by a particularly prominent, well-respected arbitration service 
provider. Although some particular due process concerns have been identified in the analysis of 
this data, one could also argue that in other respects the results show more positive outcomes 
of the system. We should be careful, however, in extrapolating from these more positive 
aspects of the AAA results to assume that the same outcomes will hold for systems operated by 
other service providers or for ad hoc arbitrations in which there is no arbitration service 
provider involved. 
 Bitter controversies have raged over the use of employment arbitration to resolve legal 
claims in the workplace. Strong policy arguments on either side of this issue have been 
intensified both by the identification of participants with the oft-opposing interests of 
employees and employers and by the high stakes involved in employment disputes. Empirical 
research is helping to shed some light on the critical issues involved in these debates over the 
development and future course of employment arbitration. Yet efforts to extend the empirical 
research in this area are also fraught with challenges. One is a conflict in disciplinary 
approaches between legal perspectives emphasizing forceful advocacy of policy positions and 
adversarial determination of correctness of arguments and social science perspectives 
emphasizing, perhaps excessively, natural science like researcher neutrality and incremental 
accumulation of knowledge on topics. This tension has perhaps most been evident in the 
controversies that have raged over the question of a repeat player effect in arbitration. My own 
judgment is that there was both an overly quick policy conclusion that a repeat player bias had 
been established based on some interesting initial research and overly strong responses to the 
empirical research that had been conducted in this area, which from a social science 
perspective should still best be viewed as some initial pieces of evidence gradually enhancing 
our understanding of a complex issue. Another challenge is the problem of access to data in a 
context of private dispute resolution processes and organizational reluctance to open internal 
procedures to outside scrutiny.160 On a personal note, I have always been enormously grateful 
to organizations that have allowed me access to them to conduct research in this area, but have 
often worried that this leads one to follow the trail from one best case scenario to another 
while missing the darker cases that are hidden from public scrutiny. If we wish to encourage 
and extend the empirical research on employment arbitration we will need researchers willing 
to engage the challenging issues in conducting research in this area, an openness to scientific 
inquiry on important questions, and the support and participation of the key actors in this 
emerging system of workplace governance. 
